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I. OVERVIEW 
Pro-democracy demonstrations and a general strike across 
Nepal in recent weeks mark a decisive shift in the 
country’s political equations and probably signal the 
approaching end of King Gyanendra’s direct rule. A 
successful popular movement could advance the search 
for peace but will depend on strong political party 
leadership in dealing with the Maoists; a messy transition 
would bring its own risks. Although domestic events will 
determine the speed and direction of political change, 
international players should use their influence to establish 
practical plans to help stabilise the situation and build a 
more lasting foundation for peace. This briefing argues 
for the early formation of a Contact Group (consisting 
of India, the U.S. and UK, working with the UN) and a 
complementary Peace Support Group (other key donors 
and international financial institutions) to form a common 
front on strategy and tactics to maximise international 
influence in assisting Nepal’s escape from its worsening 
conflict. 
The conflict remains soluble and a genuine democratic 
mass movement increases the chances of a sustainable 
and principled settlement. However, the urgent need to 
defuse the current political confrontation could lead to 
a hasty and unsustainable deal. Political leaders lack the 
necessary public confidence to conclude a backroom 
agreement with the king, while a simple return to a pre-
royal coup arrangement of a palace-appointed prime 
minister would be inherently unstable. In particular, even 
an interim settlement must take account of the Maoists 
and be designed to continue the process of drawing them 
into mainstream politics. The alternative would be to 
drive them into increased militancy and tempt them to 
exploit to the full their capacity for violence. 
While the international community has taken some 
welcome steps, these need to be better coordinated, and 
far more remains to be done. No single player is capable 
of a decisive intervention, apart from India, which does 
not want to take heavy-handed unilateral action. However, 
as in other conflicts, a group of friends or Contact Group 
could make a critical difference. 
Nepal meets most of the criteria for a successful initiative 
of this kind. The conflict is increasingly ripe for resolution. 
There is international willingness to commit time and 
resources to support a viable peace plan if one can be 
constructed. All major international players share a 
fundamental interest in seeing a more stable and 
prosperous Nepal. All sides of the conflict, albeit at 
different points and to different degrees, have suggested 
that international assistance would be useful in a peace 
process. 
The priorities include deciding on shared principles, which 
would force the major external players to confront the 
differences in their approaches; agreeing on a level of 
coordination, including an initial assessment of areas 
where there could be a united policy and where further 
discussion would be needed; initiating talks on parallel 
approaches to assist the political effort – for example, 
using human rights and development assistance to build 
confidence and ensure donors’ democracy and governance 
initiatives are in line with the overall goals; and developing 
far more detailed plans to help move a peace agreement 
and post-conflict settlement forward. 
A Contact Group should focus on: 
 immediate practical planning, including on the 
contingency of a sudden change in government; 
preparations for a small international ceasefire 
monitoring mission; and establishment of a channel 
of communication with the Maoists;  
 maintaining pressure for a peace process, including 
by introducing targeted sanctions on the royal 
government (a visa ban, investigation of 
overseas assets in preparation for freezing them 
and restriction of army participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations);  
 supporting the democratic mainstream politically 
and practically, in particular by assisting parties to 
prepare for negotiations and interim arrangements; 
and  
 keeping pressure on the Maoists to move towards 
peace and give tangible proof of their willingness 
to abandon violence by warning them that if they 
obstruct progress towards a peace process or fail to 
respect the understandings they have entered into 
with OHCHR, donors and the mainstream political 
parties, Contact Group members will coordinate 
efforts to apprehend senior leaders and interdict 
any cross-border movements.  
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A broader Peace Support Group, bringing together major 
bilateral and multilateral donors, should work in parallel to: 
 review development assistance; 
 prepare to support transitional processes such as 
constitutional reform and viable elections; and 
 start planning for how to deal with a possible 
“peace dividend”. 
A follow-up to the 2002 London conference, which first 
brought donors together to discuss the implications of 
Nepal’s conflict, might facilitate consideration of these 
matters. In any event, work on transitional arrangements 
should start immediately. Recent events suggest a 
precipitous collapse of the inherently unstable royal 
government is a distinct possibility. The international 
community has offered considerable moral support to 
Nepal in its search for peace and democracy. It must 
now get ready to translate that support into practical, 
coordinated and complementary efforts to deliver a viable 
peace process. 
II. TOWARDS THE END OF ROYAL 
RULE 
Time is running out for the royal government. Protests 
have spread across the country and the seven-party alliance 
has vowed to continue its general strike – which is being 
widely observed – until full democracy is restored. 
Professionals, business associations, civil servants and even 
the families of security personnel have started supporting 
the movement.1 The king has met the Indian, U.S. and 
Chinese ambassadors, apparently to stress that he is not 
entirely opposed to dialogue. But he has yet to win back 
the support of most royalist politicians let alone convince 
the mainstream parties that any call for talks would be 
sincere. India has sent a senior envoy, former minister 
Karan Singh, to ram home the message that nothing 
short of a substantive transfer of power to an all-party 
government will satisfy protestors and gain international 
acceptance. 
The king has never enjoyed the level of popular support for 
his experiment in autocratic rule that his supporters have 
claimed. Nevertheless, he had hoped that force of arms and 
the lack of an overwhelmingly popular alternative would 
secure his position. The April 2006 uprising has proved 
his calculation wrong. Simmering public discontent grew 
 
 
1 For example, the home ministry, which controls the police, 
announced on 18 April that it had arrested 25 of its civil 
servants, including four senior officials, for demonstrating 
against the king inside the ministry. “Officials held in Nepal 
protest”, BBC News, 18 April 2006. 
with the failure of royal rule to deliver tangible benefits and 
Gyanendra’s consistent refusal to seize opportunities for 
peace. The parties’ general strike (initially called for 
6–9 April and later extended indefinitely) galvanised 
this widespread disillusionment and translated it into a 
movement that – whether or not it immediately forces 
the palace to climb down – has irrevocably changed the 
political environment. 
There are parallels with the people’s movement of 1990 
but also several key differences. Observers and participants 
alike agree that this is the most widely supported series of 
protests since 1990, as well as the first time since then 
that crowds have repeatedly violated curfew orders even 
in the face of an armed response. Unlike in other recent 
demonstrations, the majority of participants have not been 
party activists but a more representative cross-section of 
society. As in 1990, events have been taking place across 
the country; many of the most intense protests have 
happened outside Kathmandu, in areas such as Pokhara 
and Chitwan. 
However, the movement lacks two of the criteria that 
helped in 1990. First, the external environment has 
changed: India is not likely to tighten the screws as it did 
with its 1989 trade blockade, and instead of the post-Cold 
War democratisation wave, there is a global fear of 
terrorism that the king may still use to his advantage. 
Secondly, the high hopes for democracy that fuelled public 
euphoria in 1990 will not be repeated after the decidedly 
mixed performance of the parties in government. Still, the 
protests have been boosted by sustained media coverage, 
giving participants an unprecedented awareness of parallel 
efforts across the country. On the government side, there 
is a grim determination from the top down not to repeat 
the 1990 “mistake” of being too soft on the people. 
Main features of the past several weeks include: 
 Parties in the background. The pro-democracy 
movement was prompted by the seven-party 
alliance’s call for a general strike but rapidly gained 
its own momentum. Party leaders have not been 
seen at the forefront of demonstrations, which have 
been led by lower-level cadres and non-aligned 
civil society and professional associations, as well 
as local youths and communities. 
 People taking charge. The intensity of popular 
sentiment for change both boosts the democratic 
parties’ standing and constricts their actions. Party 
leaders have been buoyed by the mass turn-out 
against royal rule – something they had quietly 
doubted until the last moment – but it does not 
equate directly to support for the parties. In 
particular, leaders are probably aware that they lack 
a clear mandate to conclude back-room deals on 
the people’s behalf. 
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 Determined security response. The security forces 
– including the Nepal Police, the Armed Police 
Force and the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) – have 
shown a willingness to use force, although the RNA 
has been careful to keep itself in the background. 
The deaths of at least ten protestors and serious 
injuries of hundreds have shocked people. Whether 
the security forces have the will to continue the 
violent suppression of peaceful protests will 
determine the royal government’s capacity to 
prolong its lifespan by force. 
 The Maoist role. Mainstream political leaders have 
stressed that this is solely their movement, not a 
joint undertaking with the Maoists. Nevertheless, 
the Maoists have deliberately assisted it with 
an intense military campaign that has increased 
pressure on the palace. At a certain point, however, 
continued violence will make it hard for the parties 
to maintain their loose alliance with the Maoists 
without jeopardising international support. The 
allies still need each other but must perform a 
delicate balancing act if they are to maximise 
mutual benefits. 
 Loss of government control. Even if the palace 
can count on unwavering army support, crucial 
constituencies have come out in favour of the pro-
democracy movement. Civil servants – even 
including senior home ministry and supreme court 
bureaucrats – have called strikes; key workers in 
the government banking, telecommunications, 
education and health sectors have also mobilised. 
Combined with support from other professionals 
and the business community, this may prove a 
fatal blow to the government’s ability to function. 
The king has been the one constant in a fluid situation. 
While some hoped that he might use his 14 April Nepali 
New Year address to the nation to offer concessions or 
make a serious call for dialogue, he stuck resolutely to 
his roadmap. Refusing even to mention the protests, he 
reiterated that he would continue as before. Party leaders, 
who are more keenly aware than ever that an unprincipled 
short-term deal would endanger their legitimacy and 
control of the movement, were offered nothing to bridge 
the gulf of mistrust that separates them from the palace. 
Only compromise can preserve the monarchy but the king 
seems almost certain to leave it too late. He may prolong 
the endgame as long as he has arms and money but these 
will not sustain him indefinitely now that he has so 
convincingly squandered popular support. The monarchy 
could probably still survive with a constitutionally 
circumscribed role in an early political settlement. The 
longer the king stays stubbornly on his course, however, 
the more likely it becomes that even a vestigial royal 
institution will no longer be acceptable to many Nepalis. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
External actors inevitably are playing and will continue 
to play parts in Nepal’s affairs. The question is how to 
manage this so as to help smooth a transition which, in the 
best of circumstances, carries many risks of instability. 
Competitive conflict resolution efforts would almost 
certainly be counterproductive. Far more can be gained if 
the major international players speak with a common 
voice. 
India, the U.S. and the UK – the three nations that should 
form the core of a Contact Group on Nepal – should be 
congratulated for maintaining unity and cohesion on 
several important policy points to date. This general 
concord has also helped move other nations to likeminded 
positions. These areas of accord can be summarised as 
follows:  
 there is no purely military solution to the conflict; 
 the Maoists should reject violence; 
 King Gyanendra should reach out to the democratic 
political parties; 
 the “constitutional forces” should work together to 
restore democracy; 
 political detainees should be released; and 
 neither the 8 February 2005 local elections, which 
were neither free nor fair, nor any future elections 
conducted without the participation of the 
democratic political parties can advance restoration 
of democracy. 
Agreement between India, the UK and U.S. on these issues 
has, however, often papered over substantial differences 
about the best strategies to achieve the twin goals of peace 
and restoring democracy. For example, the U.S. and India 
remain at odds over the merits of negotiations between 
the mainstream democratic parties and the Maoists.2 
Furthermore, the agreed starting point – an attempt to force 
reconciliation between the parties and the palace – is 
far from promising. Mistrust between those two 
sides has deepened, and the king is no longer acting 
constitutionally.3 A genuine alliance between the 
mainstream parties and the king, therefore, is unlikely. At 
the same time, the dialogue between those parties and the 
Maoists has opened a new and encouraging route towards 
peace and already produced a promise by the insurgents 
to end the conflict and enter multiparty politics. Although 
 
 
2 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005. 
3 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°41, Nepal: Beyond Royal 
Rule, 15 September 2005. 
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many obstacles, including some risks, remain, it is essential 
that this process continue as long as it offers the possibility 
of a principled, democratic settlement. 
The time has come to expand upon the existing positive 
areas of international agreement by developing more 
detailed common principles and policies.4 Such a shared 
tactical and strategic concept is essential to help end 
the current deadlock in Nepal. Crisis Group has long 
advocated a loose form of Contact Group as the best way 
of achieving a more coherent and united international 
approach. This briefing outlines how such a Contact Group 
and a broader, complementary Peace Support Group could 
be formed and proceed. 
 Contact Group. This would consist of three major 
states with political leverage: India, the U.S. and 
the UK. Their strengths and capacities are largely 
complementary. Together they could exert 
considerable political influence, which should be 
allied to the UN’s capacity, neutrality and positive 
reputation in Nepal. The Contact Group should 
draw on the particular expertise of other important 
institutions. China has traditionally avoided active 
participation in such groups but there is considerable 
utility in keeping its policy broadly in harmony. 
This suggests that China might optimally play an 
observer role within the Contact Group.5 
 Peace Support Group. This would bring together 
other concerned states (primarily Nepal’s major 
donors: Japan, the European Union (EU) and 
its member states, Norway, Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland and the like) and the international 
financial institutions (World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank). Nepal 
is heavily dependent on foreign aid, and planning 
for financial and developmental support both during 
and after a peace process will be crucial. 
IV. THE CONTACT GROUP 
Groups of “Friends” have been a crucial element in various 
conflict resolution processes since the experiences of El 
Salvador and other Latin American countries in the early 
1990s.6 While some have been very successful, others 
 
 
4 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, Nepal: Responding to 
the Royal Coup, 24 February 2005. 
5 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°111, Nepal: Electing Chaos, 
31 January 2006. 
6 Teresa Whitfield, “A Crowded Field: Groups of Friends, the 
United Nations and the Resolution of Conflict”, occasional paper 
of the Center on International Cooperation, Studies in Security 
Institutions, vol. 1, New York University, June 2005. Whitfield 
have foundered on various issues, not least flaws in the 
composition of the groups themselves and their members’ 
competing interests. This can be avoided with careful 
planning. 
Nepal is a case where a group-of-friends approach can 
work. China’s recent shift in position suggests the basic 
criterion that the major external players should not have 
conflicting interests can be met.7 The proposed Contact 
Group is largely self-selecting and combines complementary 
capacities, another main criterion for success. The Peace 
Support Group would bring together a range of actors 
who might not take such a direct political role but whose 
parallel participation would be a major asset.  
In practical terms, a Contact Group would build on the 
cooperation and dialogue that India, the U.S. and UK 
have already developed. But, however loosely structured, 
it would bring a few key changes: 
 explicit public commitment to shared principles 
for peace; 
 agreement on common policies, probably discussed 
in detail in Kathmandu but clearly endorsed at 
a senior level in capitals; 
 clear presentation of a united policy front towards 
the main actors in Nepal; and 
 willingness to collaborate with the wider support 
group where appropriate. 
The creation of a Contact Group would not require its 
members to surrender their independence of action. Where 
there was no agreed policy – for example, on whether to 
accept a particular format for talks – the group would 
simply act as the first forum in which to discuss options 
and explore the possibility of reaching consensus. 
 
 
identifies five basic criteria characterising the circumstances 
in which groups may be helpful: the external context of a given 
conflict; the nature of its parties; the interests of the group’s 
members; the group’s composition and the clarity of its 
leadership; and the phase of the process in which it is engaged. 
7 In January 2006, China made its first public comments on 
Nepal’s internal affairs, noting the “changes in Nepal’s political 
situation” and calling on “all parties” to narrow their differences 
through dialogue. Statement by Kong Quan, foreign ministry 
spokesman, 24 January 2006, available at http://www.fmprc. gov. 
cn/ce/cenp/eng/fyrth/t232764.htm. On his visit to Kathmandu 
in March 2006 State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan made a point 
of holding high-profile meetings with mainstream party leaders. 
“Chinese leader completes Nepal visit”, nepalnews.com, 18 
March 2006. Since January 2006, Japan, Nepal’s largest bilateral 
donor, has also been outspokenly critical of the royal government 
and has called for reconciliation and a return to constitutional 
rule. See Crisis Group Report, Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
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A. MEMBERS, CAPACITIES AND INTERESTS 
The strength of the Contact Group is that it would build 
upon each of its member’s capacities and interests while 
exposing none of them to charges of undue unilateral 
interference. 
1. India 
India has the greatest potential leverage over Nepal and the 
most sophisticated understanding of its politics. It is not 
squeamish about dealing with the Maoists if need be – 
something which is essential but is more difficult for other 
major states. The policy of trying to bring Nepal’s Maoists 
into the mainstream through dialogue has always prompted 
some doubts in Delhi but the increase in instability under 
Gyanendra’s direct rule has created a broad consensus 
that it remains the least bad option.8 India also has long 
experience of contributing to conflict resolution and peace 
processes elsewhere in the world, not least as a major 
contributor of peacekeeping troops. Indian diplomats 
have direct experience of such operations and the political 
requirements for their success. 
India knows that it can only achieve its policy goals 
in Nepal unilaterally at a great cost. Working within a 
multilateral framework would allow the same goals 
to be reached without the risk of appearing to be overtly 
interventionist. It makes sense for India to take the lead in 
putting together a multilateral effort rather than constantly 
fending off a variety of other players. There are certain 
tasks, such as ceasefire or election monitoring, that others 
are better positioned to perform. 
Indian participation would help ensure that any potential 
UN involvement was concisely defined and dedicated 
to those areas where the organisation’s expertise is 
recognised, such as the current mission of the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). India 
has always preferred that the UN not have a prominent 
role in South Asian issues due to its experiences in 
Kashmir and concerns about losing influence to the 
Security Council. However it would be able to tolerate a 
limited UN role. Indian participation, along with Chinese 
observer status, would also help defuse great power 
 
 
8 Heightened concerns about India’s own growing Maoist 
problem have led to a more determined policy in New Delhi, 
with the central government attempting to put together a better 
coordinated security and economic development package with 
relevant state governments. However, the official assessment 
is that Nepal’s Maoists do not provide significant material 
assistance to the Indian rebels. Furthermore, Indian analysts do 
not believe the current royal government provides a viable basis 
for a solid political counter-insurgency strategy, let alone re-
establishing effective governance across the countryside. Crisis 
Group interviews, New Delhi, April 2006. 
tensions and rivalries over Nepal. Crafting a multilateral 
approach that recognises India’s unique relationship to 
Nepal, including an open border and extensive economic 
and social ties, would allow for constructive multilateral 
engagement without crossing any of New Delhi’s red lines. 
2. United States 
U.S. policy remains broadly in concert with India and the 
UK, although the U.S. has been more sceptical of the 
Maoists’ willingness and ability to accept democratic 
politics. Sustained pressure on the king to engage with the 
political parties has yet to bear fruit, and frustration with 
the palace’s inflexibility is mounting, as are Congressional 
concerns over the failure of current efforts to roll back 
autocratic rule and address the insurgency.9 
U.S. political clout, including its weight within the UN 
Security Council, is crucial for an effective Contact Group 
but Washington’s policies are likely to achieve more if 
aligned with those of India and others. The U.S. retains 
good links with the palace and the RNA: it is in an 
advantageous position to use these for both persuasion 
and reassurance. 
Collaboration with India and within a wider grouping 
would serve U.S. interests in developing bilateral ties 
with New Delhi (a much higher strategic priority than 
involvement in Nepal), including assisting India to take 
the more prominent international role that Washington 
desires. The Contact Group would allow the U.S. to 
participate in forging a collaborative multilateral approach 
rather than be obliged to pursue a piecemeal, more 
unilateral policy. A comprehensive peace agreement in 
Nepal would also complement regional counter-terrorism 
efforts. 
3. United Kingdom 
The UK has invested significant political and financial 
resources in conflict prevention and resolution (not least 
via the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and in the UN).10 
It has less direct leverage than either India or the U.S. 
but its good understanding of the situation in Nepal and 
diplomatic skills would be invaluable. Its long relationship 
with the country and involvement in South Asia have 
 
 
9 Crisis Group interviews, Washington, February–March 2006. 
10 The Global Conflict Prevention Pool was established in 2001 to 
make the UK’s approach to conflict prevention more effective 
through the sharing of information and resources between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence 
and the Department for International Development (DfID). 
In 2004/2005 it had a program budget of £74 million. “Conflict 
Prevention”, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/ 
Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029393906. 
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given it depth of understanding and close relationships 
with regional players, including an enduring relationship 
with the RNA and the Nepalese ruling elite. 
Putting together a group of friends requires particular 
diplomatic skills that play to two proven UK strengths: 
acting as a bridge between the U.S. and others, in particular 
the EU; and skill at UN-oriented diplomacy, including 
maintaining smooth working relationships between players 
in New York and elsewhere. UK military expertise in Nepal 
could also prove particularly useful in any disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) exercise. 
Historic and sentimental links to Nepal are important 
in the UK, where there is a degree of public interest 
and concern as well as some political interest (e.g. the 
parliamentary all-party group). Playing a pivotal role in a 
broader coalition would be well received by the British 
public, as well as offer London greater leverage than it 
could exercise on its own.  
4. The United Nations 
The UN’s expertise and standing within Nepal make it 
indispensable to any multilateral effort. While the actions 
of the major states are generally attributed to their 
real or perceived interests, the UN is seen as neutral. The 
mainstream parties and the Maoists consequently look 
favourably on some degree of UN involvement in a peace 
process. If called on to help broker a ceasefire and draw 
up a professional separation of forces agreement, the 
organisation’s technical expertise would be enhanced by 
longstanding personal relations of trust between senior 
officials in its peacekeeping branch (DPKO) and RNA 
officers who have been involved in peacekeeping missions. 
Moreover, the UN Secretariat is already engaged in crucial 
areas in the country and can help to keep the Nepal issue 
more firmly on the agenda in New York. However, there 
is no predetermined role for the UN within the proposed 
Contact Group. The Secretary General might choose to 
keep the organisation’s options open by avoiding too close 
an association with the Contact Group’s forceful political 
agenda. While, as already noted, India has traditionally 
been reticent to accept a UN role in conflicts in its 
perceived sphere of influence, a carefully delimited and 
constructive role for the organisation could well serve its 
long-term foreign policy interests in seeing the situation 
in Nepal peacefully resolved. 
B. PRINCIPLES 
Nepal’s friends should unite around a set of basic 
principles for resolving the conflict. The ultimate aim is 
not to shape the country’s political institutions or force a 
particular outcome but to use all leverage to help bring 
about peace and create an environment in which the Nepali 
people can determine their own future. Putting principles 
at the centre of planning is the best way of avoiding the 
trap of supporting state institutions for their own sake, 
even when they may be obstacles to peace. These 
principles should include: 
1. a negotiated peace process, involving wide 
participation of civil society representatives, 
including women, not just the armed parties and 
political elites; 
2. Maoist rejection of violence and acceptance of 
complete disarmament as part of a negotiated 
settlement; 
3. full respect by all parties for fundamental human 
rights; 
4. establishment of constitutional democracy, with 
sovereignty vested in the people and at most a 
basically ceremonial role defined for the monarch; 
5. an environment of complete political freedom 
enabling viable elections that reflect the popular 
will; 
6. full civilian control of security forces; 
7. establishment of a more inclusive political system 
that addresses the enduring underlying causes of 
conflict and underdevelopment; and 
8. setting of an equitable development and economic 
agenda that benefits the entire country and 
particularly its traditionally marginalised groups. 
C. POLICY PLATFORM 
By establishing a common platform of practical policy 
initiatives built upon points about which all sides would 
have difficulty disagreeing, the Contact Group and its allies 
could remove a number of major impediments. Indeed, 
the further the Contact Group could go in spelling out a 
roadmap for peace, the more likely the process would 
move forward. 
The tasks the Contact Group should initially undertake fall 
into two broad categories: immediate practical planning, 
designed to be prepared for the contingency of a rapid 
change of government and to operationalise a viable 
ceasefire and a credible demilitarisation strategy; and 
maintaining pressure on both armed sides for a peace 
process, while strengthening the democratic mainstream. 
1. Immediate practical planning 
The contingency of a sudden collapse of the present 
royal government 
Given the volatile situation on the ground, as well as some 
signs that the royal family has already begun to move 
assets out of the country, the Contact Group needs to take 
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a hard look at what to do in the event of the sudden 
collapse of the royal government. An abrupt and unplanned 
transition could well lead to considerable violence in the 
Kathmandu valley and set off a free-for-all as all sides vied 
for power. The Contact Group should initiate discussions 
with the RNA and the Maoists, urging them to refrain from 
offensive actions should there be such a development and 
to develop direct lines of communication with each other in 
such circumstances. The Contact Group should make clear 
that the only arrangement that could gain international 
support during the transition would be some form of 
government of national unity led by civilian democratic 
forces.  
In such a situation – or indeed in any peace process which 
assumed the cantonment of armed forces – the role of the 
police would be critical. The Nepal Police is demoralised 
and more detached from local communities than at any 
stage in its history. Contact Group members, supported by 
other donors, should give urgent thought to how best to 
strengthen community-based policing and ensure that basic 
security functions can be carried out once a ceasefire is in 
place. 
An international military observer mission to monitor 
and observe a ceasefire 
The Contact Group should lead planning for a small 
international mission, with 100 to 200 members but not 
including troops from India or the U.S. (given the extreme 
political sensitivity of deploying their forces in Nepal). 
Such a mission would require helicopters in order to 
investigate quickly any local incident or ceasefire violation. 
Given that the conflict does not have traditional front 
lines, and no internationals have been targeted, it could be 
deployed with a relatively light footprint.  
The urgency for developing concrete plans is considerable. 
The 2003 ceasefire and code of conduct between the 
RNA and Maoists collapsed in no small part because the 
agreement did not include a monitoring or enforcement 
mechanism. The Contact Group would need to flesh out 
the exact roles for the proposed ceasefire monitoring 
mission. An important question is whether the mission 
would be a purely reactive body to investigate violations, 
or would try to create the conditions for achieving lasting 
peace by monitoring and assisting the disarmament and 
demobilisation process. Such a mission could be structured 
and operate in a variety of ways under the UN umbrella, 
including through the Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) or even the Human Rights office. There is a clear 
need to move forward with far more detailed operational 
planning and to determine who might contribute to such a 
mission. Given Nepal’s generally good international image 
– the current chaos aside – a number of nations would 
likely be willing. 
Contact Group planning would demonstrate international 
seriousness of purpose and help remove a major stumbling 
block to a lasting peace. Again, this force should be 
carefully delimited in scope and responsibilities. As 
OHCHR has demonstrated, a small mission of dedicated 
professionals (in this case military observers rather than 
human rights experts) can make a demonstrable difference 
on the ground. 
While the Maoists have repeatedly stated they would 
welcome international monitoring of a ceasefire, there 
has been no concerted effort to put this to the test. Previous 
ceasefires – whether unilateral or bilateral – that have 
lacked this quality have collapsed in disarray and mistrust, 
making the conflict ever more intractable. By putting a 
practical plan on the table, the Contact Group would give 
all parties to the conflict important guarantees and set in 
place an important piece of a practical road map. 
A ceasefire and effective peace negotiations are two 
different things, and both will ultimately be necessary. 
Theoretically, a ceasefire and negotiations could exist 
independently of each other, and the overall agenda set out 
in this paper is not dependent upon a halt in hostilities. 
Given the triangular nature of any prospective peace talks, 
however, a ceasefire may well be the logical and most 
feasible starting point. 
A reasonably strong case can be made that the UN is best 
placed to lead and conduct such a monitoring mission. 
It has considerable experience and enjoys generally 
high regard among Nepalis, as well as a long working 
relationship with the RNA. Given that no one envisages a 
large peacekeeping force, nor one with coercive powers, 
various alternative arrangements may be feasible. Some 
have suggested that the EU could take on the responsibility 
but this would require capacities well beyond what it 
currently has dedicated to Nepal. Another alternative might 
be members of the proposed Peace Support Group. 
To be successful, a ceasefire monitoring process 
would need a solid sense of Nepali ownership: not only 
cooperation from the two warring sides but also active 
support from mainstream parties, civil society and local 
populations. The OHCHR mission has demonstrated that 
such synergy is possible.  
A channel of communication with the Maoists 
In order to develop its plans for a military observer mission 
more fully and establish effective red lines for an eventual 
peace settlement, the Contact Group would need to engage 
directly with the Maoists. By no means should this be read 
as an endorsement of their political goals or violent 
methods. It would be a practical step for testing Maoist 
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willingness to abandon armed insurgency and enter a 
legitimate political process.11 
Such a communication channel would facilitate key tasks, 
including: 
 discussing the modalities of an international 
ceasefire monitoring mission; 
 starting talk on potential DDR packages for Maoist 
cadres and leadership; 
 reaching agreement on how a ceasefire and DDR 
efforts could be guaranteed through the existing 
Maoist command and control structures; 
 reaching agreement on how best to conduct the 
force census necessary to advance the above 
efforts; 
 establishing practical plans for an internationally 
verifiable cantonment of weapons as part of a 
broader peace agreement and as a necessary 
precursor to DDR efforts; and 
 developing practical plans to ensure the Maoists 
do not practice extortion or intimidation during a 
ceasefire. 
In view of the highly sensitive nature of such discussions, 
they would likely best be conducted by a military officer 
from a Contact Group country in close conjunction with 
representatives of whichever institution would be expected 
to lead the international military monitoring mission. It is 
important that whoever is expected to implement these 
arrangements be closely involved in negotiating them. 
2. Maintaining pressure for a peace process 
Targeted sanctions 
All Contact Group members have stated clearly it is the 
king’s responsibility to reach out to the political parties 
and restore democratic rule. Since he has continued to 
ignore such calls, it is appropriate to introduce targeted 
sanctions aimed exclusively at the ruling elite. The most 
effective would include: 
 Visa ban. The international community has 
implemented only the most tepid of initial 
measures with regard to visits and travel by senior 
representatives of the royal government. For 
example, both the U.S. and the EU have quietly 
embargoed official ministerial visits but this has 
not precluded members of the government and 
 
 
11 Diplomatic missions, including those of India, the U.S. and 
UK, felt it worthwhile – and not too uncomfortable – to meet 
Maoist leaders during the 2003 ceasefire. The U.S.’s proscription 
of the Maoists as terrorists does not in itself impose restrictions on 
U.S. government officials dealing with Maoist representatives. 
royal family from visiting European capitals or 
otherwise travelling freely. The members of the 
Contact Group – and the EU as a whole – should 
institute a full visa ban on the royal family; all 
ministers; RNA officers of the rank of brigadier-
general and above; officers in command of units 
accused of serious abuses;12 senior palace advisers 
including, but not limited to, Pashupati Bhakta 
Maharjan, Sharadchandra Shah, Sachchit Shamsher 
Rana, Parsu Narayan Choudhury, Chiran Shamsher 
Thapa and Keshav Raj Rajbhandari;13 and palace-
appointed regional and zonal administrators. 
 Asset investigation in preparation for freeze. A 
joint EU-U.S. task force should identify offshore 
assets of the royal family and the officials cited 
above. The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets 
Control and the UK Treasury International Financial 
Services Team, in view of the breadth of their 
expertise, should be given the lead within such a 
joint task force. 
 Restriction of RNA participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. The RNA would feel 
acutely a significant curtailment of opportunities to 
participate in UN peacekeeping operations, which 
bring it not only international prestige but also 
significant income. Indeed, its penchant for 
contributing to such activities – at levels which have 
increased significantly since it was first mobilised 
for domestic counter-insurgency duties – undercuts 
claims that it is overextended in combating the 
Maoists.14 Discussion about the merits of restricting 
RNA participation in peacekeeping has made 
modest progress in New York but stronger 
leadership from the Contact Group could turn this 
into effective leverage.  
Members of the Contact Group, or their respective 
parliaments, should make clear to the UN’s 
 
 
12 This would include officers who have moved on to new 
commands since uninvestigated violations took place. Although 
the RNA has taken action against a number of violators, concerns 
about process and level of punishment persist. Accusations can 
only be considered satisfactorily investigated if the RNA grants 
OHCHR unrestricted access to the proceedings and rulings 
of courts martial (which remain beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Nepal supreme court). 
13 It is no coincidence that all these senior advisers also played 
major roles in the violent attempted suppression of the 1990 
democracy movement. See Crisis Group Report, Electing 
Chaos, op. cit. 
14 Until mid-2003 Nepal had some 1,000 troops, police and 
military observers deployed on UN missions at any given time. 
Since then, these deployments have increased rapidly and now 
average 3,500. In January 2006, 3,023 troops, 46 police and 448 
observers were deployed according to DPKO statistics. 
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Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
that they expect RNA units accused of serious rights 
violations to be excluded from peacekeeping 
operations. They should also reassure DPKO that 
they would help address any resultant mission 
shortfalls. The international community rightly 
does not wish to isolate the RNA but can justifiably 
make all engagement conditional on concrete steps 
towards both ending the climate of impunity 
surrounding abuses and preparing to become 
accountable to an elected, civilian government. 
As with all sanctions, these measures should not be empty 
threats. Governments need to devote attention to how to 
implement them in order to be credible. Targeted sanctions 
will also be a blunt weapon if the reasons for imposing 
them and conditions for lifting them are not clearly 
specified. The purpose of these measures is to encourage 
a return to democracy and engagement in serious peace 
negotiations. Given the king’s record of empty promises, 
strict tests should be set for lifting sanctions, including 
concrete steps to surrender powers and return the 
government to accountable representatives and similarly 
demonstrable progress in entering and sustaining serious 
negotiations. 
Pressure on the Maoists 
The international community has had extremely limited 
influence on the Maoists. However, their desire to win 
international acceptability and their preference for some 
third-party engagement provide significant leverage 
which is yet to be fully exploited.15 The Maoists’ ultimate 
intentions remain frustratingly opaque, despite their formal 
commitment to entering mainstream, multiparty politics. 
It is essential to maintain pressure on them to ensure that 
their aims cannot be achieved through violent or other 
illegitimate means. The best way to test the Maoists is by 
their actions on the ground. Negotiations with a unified 
leadership – which appears to exercise a reasonable degree 
of command and control over the movement as a whole – 
may well be preferable to the insurgency splintering and 
becoming more intractable. 16 The Contact Group should: 
 
 
15 For example, since the Maoists promised to adhere to the Basic 
Operating Guidelines developed by major donors (see “UN 
welcomes Maoists’ recognition of BOG”, nepalnews.com, 22 
December 2005), they have made efforts to address promptly 
every violation brought to their attention via the UN. Most 
importantly, engagement with regional commanders – the level 
at which leaders’ stated policy is translated into action on 
the ground – has been productive. Crisis Group interview, 
Kathmandu, April 2006. 
16 See Crisis Group Reports Nepal’s Maoists, op.cit. and 
Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
 offer the Maoists assurances that international 
recognition as a legitimate political force will be 
possible once they have entered an internationally 
monitored ceasefire, negotiations on a peace 
settlement and a demonstrable process of 
disarmament, with the aim of joining mainstream 
democratic politics; and 
 warn the Maoists that if they obstruct progress 
towards a peace process or fail to respect the 
understandings they have entered into with OHCHR, 
donors and the mainstream political parties, 
Contact Group members will coordinate efforts 
to apprehend senior leaders and interdict any 
cross-border movements; explore the possibility 
of referring Maoist abuses to an appropriate 
international criminal tribunal; and, if a democratic 
government is restored, give considerably enhanced 
help to its counter-insurgency efforts. 
Support for the democratic mainstream 
While all Contact Group members have identified 
restoration of democracy as a central strategic goal, they 
have remained somewhat reluctant to offer the mainstream 
parties the kind of direct organisational support that has 
been proffered in similar situations in which democratic 
forces have been trying to dislodge an autocratic 
government. High-profile meetings between joint Contact 
Group representatives and the seven-party alliance would 
both give the parties important moral support and allow 
for practical operational discussions on how best to move 
forward. Such discussions should include the contours 
of a government of national unity, how to manage a 
constitutional reform process (almost certainly through 
some form of constituent assembly),17 conditions for 
eventual elections, support for political party reform, and 
means of enhancing negotiating capacity in advance of 
further engagements with the Maoists and/or the Palace. 
As Contact Group members have already made clear, 
any elections held without participation of the major 
democratic parties in a free and fair environment would 
be fruitless, as would be any palace effort to perpetuate 
royal rule through another hand-picked prime minister. 
 
 
17 The longstanding Maoist demand for an elected constituent 
assembly has now been agreed to by the mainstream seven-party 
alliance. Some legal analysts suggest the king might be persuaded 
to accept a constituent assembly with pre-negotiated guarantees 
to preserve at least a ceremonial monarchy, although there have 
been no signs that Gyanendra is yet prepared to compromise. See 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005, and Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
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V. THE PEACE SUPPORT GROUP 
The establishment of a Contact Group should by no means 
diminish the crucial role of the wider community of 
Nepal’s friends and development partners. In fact, its 
formation would make it all the more essential that those 
other nations and institutions develop a consensus and 
practical initiatives as integral components of a coordinated 
push for peace. Formation of a broader Peace Support 
Group, which combined the established operational 
strengths of its members, would be of enormous utility. 
A. MEMBERS 
The Peace Support Group would ally the financial, 
technical and developmental capacities of its members to 
the political leverage of the Contact Group. Here, too, 
major donors share similar fundamental aims, all of which 
could be better achieved through a common platform. 
Key members should include the EU, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland, Canada and Australia, working in concert 
with the major international financial institutions – the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the Asian 
Development Bank. It would also be useful to have an 
observer from the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). 
There is considerable scope for greater EU involvement in 
the peace process but this probably requires more on-the-
ground representation. Only five of the EU’s 25 member 
states have a full-time diplomatic presence in Kathmandu, 
which has made it difficult to place Nepal issues prominently 
on the agenda in Brussels. If the EU wishes to engage in 
the situation more directly, it should consider appointing 
an EU Special Representative. This would not only enable 
better coordination within the EU and more attention to 
Nepal in Brussels, but also facilitate more effective 
communication between the EU and the Contact Group. 
It might be useful for the Peace Support Group to establish 
a working group to keep international NGOs fully 
informed and to benefit from their input. Obviously many 
such NGOs hope to steer clear of any explicitly political 
discussions but all can make an important contribution to 
peace by sharing their insights from the field. The UN’s 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) has already done some coordination through its 
Combined Humanitarian Action Plan. This exercise may 
offer pointers for further work in enhancing cooperation 
between international governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. 
In order to place Nepal more prominently on the 
international agenda, the Peace Support Group and the 
Contact Group could organise an international conference 
along the lines of the 2002 London conference, which 
was useful in focusing the international approach and 
generating potential policy responses based on a shared 
vision of the conflict.18 Beyond supporting an integrated 
approach to security, reform and development, 
participants stressed the urgent need to tackle poverty, 
exclusion, poor governance, discrimination, corruption, 
livelihoods and human rights.19 The 2002 conference 
called for a further meeting;20 the time would seem to 
be ripe for such a session.  
Donors have in the past met biannually with the 
government of Nepal under the auspices of the Nepal 
Development Forum. The 2006 session will not be held 
due to deteriorating relations. A group of major donors 
met in London in November 2005 and issued a common 
statement regarding their approach.21 They recognised 
that peace is a prerequisite for development, called on all 
actors to commit to a durable ceasefire as a first step in a 
wider peace process and reaffirmed their willingness to 
support a democratic and inclusive peace process. 
A follow-up to the 2002 London conference could 
both build upon this effort and serve as a more effective 
alternative to the suspended Nepal Development Forum. 
In the current political context, it should not invite Nepali 
government participation.22 However, it could devote one 
session to discussions with civil society representatives 
and might consider inviting mainstream party leaders to 
participate in a session on longer term development plans 
 
 
18 The conference was hosted by the British government on 19–
20 June 2002. Nepal, the UK, U.S., India, China, Russia, Japan, 
France, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, 
Australia, the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN 
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) and the World Bank 
were represented at senior levels. 
19 “UK Hosts an International Conference on Nepal”, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Press Release, London, 20 June 
2002. 
20 “A Chairman’s Statement”, International Conference on 
Nepal, Armourer’s Hall, London 19–20 June 2002. 
21 “Meeting of a group of Nepal’s development donors”, 
UK Department for International Development (DfID) press 
statement, 23 November 2005, at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/ 
files/nepal-donors-group-nov-05.asp. The meeting brought 
together senior officials from Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, the U.S., 
the UN and the EU. Representatives of the World Bank, IMF 
and Asian Development Bank contributed to part of the meeting 
via videolink from Kathmandu. 
22 In this respect, it would be closer to the February 2005 
Washington conference on Bangladesh, which sent a strong 
message by bringing together major donors without inviting that 
country’s representation. Diplomats felt this approach generated 
serious attention in Dhaka. Crisis Group interviews, Washington, 
London and Brussels, June–July 2005; Dhaka, August 2005. 
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to be implemented after the restoration of democracy. 
Donors could use such a conference to pledge support 
in the context of a peace process but should be wary of 
making precipitous promises at too early a stage. 
B. PRACTICAL INITIATIVES 
The Peace Support Group should coalesce around specific 
policy initiatives, both to demonstrate its unity and to 
advance the peace process. These include: 
1. Review development assistance  
There is no desire to use development aid as a blunt 
instrument or to introduce penalties that would cause 
undue suffering among a population that has already been 
widely victimised. That said, it is appropriate for the donor 
community to review the efficacy of its programs in light of 
the royal government’s lack of democracy, accountability 
and sustainability. Donors should conduct this review 
with an eye to determining which programs perpetuate the 
government’s power monopoly and which might help 
break the deadlock. Such a review would work best if 
based on common criteria for calibrated engagement, 
identifying which types of assistance, even in potentially 
unpromising areas, could support moves in the right 
direction. Agreed criteria would help to avoid piecemeal 
or conflicting approaches to engagement. Benchmarks for 
effective political governance are particularly important. 
These should include: (i) accountability, (ii) participation 
and responsiveness, (iii) rule of law, (iv) transparency and 
(v) non-discrimination. 
2. Prepare to support transitional processes such 
as constitutional reform and viable elections 
Nepal’s political parties have consistently advocated 
restoration of democracy and some form of constitutional 
revision. However, their thinking and planning have often 
been shallow. They need to improve their capacity to 
prepare sensible policy alternatives in these areas. Peace 
Support Group help would be particularly useful in 
establishing the benchmarks for an eventual election under 
conditions of a ceasefire, strengthening a neutral Election 
Commission and planning for deployment of election 
monitors. The Group’s members should encourage the 
political parties to develop position papers on constitutional 
reform and be ready to offer technical assistance if 
requested. Transitional justice, local peace building efforts, 
the inclusion of women and minorities in the peace process 
and eventual demilitarisation of the Maoist movement – 
beyond physical disarmament – are all areas where Peace 
Support Group involvement would be beneficial. 
3. Start planning for a possible “peace dividend” 
A lasting peace will not be achieved instantly. The process 
needs to include a carefully managed post-conflict phase, 
which requires continued international assistance. Parties 
to the conflict might be tempted into talks by promises of 
a financial “peace dividend” but an ill-conceived injection 
of cash and other aid could well be counterproductive, 
spurring further conflict as actors fought for the spoils. 
Donor help in designing and funding DDR packages will 
be essential, as will efforts to restore long neglected basic 
social services in villages. As the peace process takes 
hold, more significant steps may become possible. There 
is potential for significant international commitment: 
despite Nepal’s currently constricted development space, 
not a single donor has pulled out. Institutions such as the 
World Bank could play a critical role, for example on 
possible debt relief. Nepal is theoretically eligible but has 
not met requirements such as having a functioning reform 
program. Advance planning with the mainstream parties 
could position it more quickly for greater help following a 
peace deal. 
Once it is up and running, the Peacebuilding Commission 
established by the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council in December 2005 could coordinate support to a 
post-agreement Nepal under its mandate to assume a key 
role with respect to countries emerging from conflict. 
However, it will be a number of months before the 
Commission takes shape and, given other priorities that 
are already on the Security Council agenda, it is unlikely 
to get involved quickly unless the government of Nepal 
specifically requests its assistance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Building greater international unity and consensus, while 
invaluable, will not in itself overcome all the obstacles to 
peace. A lasting peace can only be secured by the people of 
Nepal working together and forging difficult compromises. 
Equally, a Contact Group might not erase all the policy 
differences between its members but it would give them 
far more effective leverage and could help establish a 
practical roadmap for peace. It is not difficult to imagine 
the parameters of a peace deal that would be acceptable 
to the political parties, the monarchy and the Maoists. 
However, it has remained quite difficult for all sides to 
approach such an agreement. Even if the current 
movement succeeds in restoring democracy, that will only 
be the start of a long and tough road to peace. In any case, 
the coordinated international assistance possible through a 
Contact Group will be essential. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 19 April 2006 
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